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Abstract 
Accounts of secularization, decline and marginalization in relation to the public 
position of religion in Western society have failed to account for the continued vitality 
and relevance of religion in the global public square. It is important, however, to 
challenge simplistic accounts and think of the new visibility of religion (not least in 
Europe) in terms of complexity and multi-dimensionality. This article will ask how 
public theology might contribute constructively to repairing our fractured body politic 
and promoting new models of citizenship and civic engagement around visions of the 
common good. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, I will argue that recent signs of the resurgence of public religion not only 
confound much received wisdom about the fate of religion in Western society, but 
present new and unprecedented challenges at the levels of theory, policy and 
practice.1 I begin from the conundrum that has beset the study of religion and public 
policy for the past two decades: how, given all predictions regarding the ultimate 
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demise of religion, has religious belief and practice made such a dramatic return to 
the public stage? Accounts of secularization, decline and marginalization in relation 
to the public position of religion in Western society have failed to account for the 
continued vitality and relevance of religion in the global public square. And yet in part 
because of such a theoretical mindset around the inevitable decline of religion and 
the victory of the secular, we must now reckon for its continued existence alongside, 
and in opposition to, political philosophies that resist its incursion into what is still 
considered a neutral, secular public sphere. We find ourselves confronted by new 
waves of religious faith that in their novel and unexpected qualities pose considerable 
new challenges for the way we think, legislate and behave in relation to religion.  
Like others, I have chosen to characterize this context as one of ‘post-secular’ 
society2 and I will explain in more detail the specific challenges and complexities that 
come with that. Overall, what it does is to challenge simplistic accounts and to think 
of the new visibility of religion (not least in Europe) in terms of complexity and multi-
dimensionality.  
There are a number of aspects to this. Firstly, there is the way in which religious 
organizations mobilize networks of activism and association that are simultaneously 
local, national and international. Secondly, there is the capacity of faith-based 
activism to combine the ‘what’ of the resources of social, economic and human 
capital with the ‘why’ of beliefs, ethics and attitudes. Thirdly, we are confronted by the 
often paradoxical and agonistic dimensions of the post-secular age, in which the 
renewed visibility and currency of faith-based social action continues to be 
challenged by secularist voices that question the very legitimacy of religious 
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interventions in the public square.  
In addressing how public policy might deal with such impasses, I will consider how 
these dimensions represent ambivalent legacies. The transnational scope of religion 
yields significant sensibilities of internationalism but generates divided loyalties in 
many citizens, thereby undermining national sovereignty. Despite calls to incorporate 
religious reasoning into public debate, there is little consensus on how that might be 
reached peaceably and democratically. And finally, the rise of religious identity as a 
mark of cultural difference renders existing conventions of equality and diversity 
legislation more problematic. Whilst I have no ultimate solutions, I will argue for 
policies and practices which (1) foster greater reflexivity on the part of citizens—
through, for example, programmes of religious literacy—and which (2) pay attention 
to the ways in which broad-based local collaborations can foster forms of post-
secular rapprochement—such that religious values are tested and mediated through 
the promotion of the common good. Reflexivity and rapprochement become 
watchwords of renewed post-secular civic practices. 
 
2. The ‘Death of God’ and other Rumours 
So, is God dead or have rumours of his or her demise been exaggerated? For most 
of the second half of the twentieth century, the gradual marginalization of religious 
belief and institutions and the privatization of religious belief and practice formed the 
mainstay of social scientific thinking about religion. Generations of scholars and 
public institutions in the West believed that religion was in terminal decline and that 
gradually it would migrate to the margins of public life before disappearing altogether. 
The trajectory leading humanity from the religious to the secular seemed somehow 
inbuilt to the process of history. The decline of religion was inevitable and 
irreversible—indeed desirable, as any incursion of religion into public life represented 
a diminishment of our human freedom, and was incompatible with modern values of 
science, reason, enlightenment and progress.  
But that’s not what’s happened. From the last quarter of the twentieth century the 
world began to see the unexpected ‘re-enchantment’3 of global politics—something 
we can probably date from the Iranian revolution in 1979, the rise of the Moral 
Majority in the US in the 1980s, the emergence of Islamist movements in the Middle 
East, Africa and South Asia. Clearly, the destruction of the World Trade Center on 11 
September 2001 stands as an iconic and devastating moment in all this, as an 
explicitly-religiously motivated intervention in world affairs.  
Globally, of course, the rise of radical Islam, especially in the Middle East, East Asia 
and Africa, and of Hindu nationalism in India, represent examples of the ways in 
which, far from receding to the margins of our political consciousness, religion has 
now erupted with unprecedented force. Over the past two years many European 
cities have been faced with shocking examples of what happens when religion erupts 
into public life and onto our streets, public buildings and our news media.  
In early January 2015 the people of Paris were reeling from the attacks on Charlie 
Hebdo magazine. As a publication, Charlie Hebdo was known for its 
uncompromising, often scurrilous, criticism of religious extremism and the abuses of 
power committed by organized religion. This incident was supposedly a reprisal for its 
controversial, some felt offensive, portrayal of Islam. Then in November there were 
attacks on the Bataclan theatre and other venues. Since the beginning of 2016, there 
have been further incidents in Istanbul, Brussels and Ansbach, as well as (much less 
widely reported) violence in Burkina Faso, Jakarta and Istanbul, apparently as the 
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result of actions by insurgents from Daesh, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS).  
On another level altogether, but nevertheless quite telling, I think, was the media 
storm over the summer of 2016 about the wearing of the so-called ‘burkini’ on certain 
beaches in the south of France. The burkini, a conflation of ‘burqa’ (or ‘burkha’) and 
‘bikini’, and denoting a form of swimwear for (mainly Muslim) women which is seen 
as conforming to certain religious standards of modesty, became the subject of legal 
and cultural debate when media images were circulated of police officers requiring 
women to remove their clothing, and legal battles over whether it was constitutional 
under French law to prohibit such beachwear.4 
Within Europe, however, where institutional Christian (but not other religions’) decline 
appears to be a verification of some aspects of twentieth century secularization 
theory, religion is reasserting its visibility within the political discourses shaping 
fundamental debates about the social order, as well as colonizing new spaces and 
generating new alliances and social movements. Ironically, cuts in government 
funding since the economic crisis of 2008–9 have furnished the churches with 
opportunities to ‘push back against the pressures of secularization’5 by offering 
buildings, resources and volunteers as statutory facilities are withdrawn. There are 
other dimensions to this new visibility: evidence consistently reports that those who 
participate in religious activities record higher levels of well-being and mental health, 
prompting renewed interest in the clinical benefits of religion and spiritual practice.6  
Such talk of resurgence must be tempered, however, by unequivocal evidence of 
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drastic decline in the institutional strength of organized Christianity in the West, and 
especially Western Europe.  
 
[Insert Table here] 
 
Formal affiliation across the mainstream Christian denominations, however it is 
measured, continues to fall. And even if organized forms of religion hold sway, they 
are far more deinstitutionalized and fluid due to social media, globalization and 
changing patterns of membership and affiliation.  
Overall, this offers us a picture of the contemporary cultural landscape as 
characterized by contradictory and unprecedented currents of religious pluralism and 
diversification, coupled with institutional decline and strong resistance to expressions 
of religion in public. We are confronted with ‘a perfect storm’, therefore, of conflicting 
and contradictory currents, which the recent Commission on Religion and Belief in 
British Public Life summarized in this way: 
 Increase of those identifying as having ‘No Religion’;  
 decline in Christian belief and affiliation;  
 increasing diversity amongst those who do claim a religious faith.7 
In short, what many are describing as the ‘post-secular’ is when ‘the presuppositions 
of the secularization thesis no longer apply’.8 Modernization does not necessarily 
lead to the effacement of religion; yet by implication, currents of modernization and 
secularism can and do co-exist with continuing attachment to traditional, religiously-
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derived, forms of belief and identity. Rather than being the inexorable outcome of 
unilinear social change, secularism comes to be seen as but one option amongst 
‘multiple modernities’.9 This unprecedented co-existence of the sacred and the 
secular is why I don’t think of our current situation as merely a religious revival, but as 
something quite novel and distinct. It is clear that against many expectations, religion 
has not vanished from Western culture. If anything, it exercises a greater fascination 
than ever before.  
 
3. Return of Religion to the Public Square 
This characteristic of the simultaneous and problematic co-existence of religion in the 
public square creates, in turn, a highly ambivalent, even agonistic, climate for policy-
makers. I want now to touch briefly on three examples: how religion confounds the 
boundaries of local, national, global; how religion injects the language of value into 
public discourse; and how religious identity is being incorporated into existing equality 
and diversity frameworks.  
 
3.1 Local, National, Global Expressions of Religion: a Case of Divided Loyalties? 
One of the distinctive contributions that faith-based organizations make to the public 
square is their ability to draw together levels of local, national and international 
mobilization. They are, perhaps uniquely, genuinely transnational organizations. The 
flows of globalization are of course one of the major factors to have shaped the 
resurgence of religion, as migrants from the global South—often from former 
European colonies—have moved into Europe and the United States, bringing vital 
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new expressions of religious belief and practice back into the public square.  
Yet, of course, this has been an ambivalent heritage. The rise of political Islam in the 
Middle East is due in part to the history of economic and political intervention on the 
part of European states and the United States—but that global drama is also played 
out at a local level as European and American young Muslims are ‘radicalized’ by 
events in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria and are drawn to take part in armed struggle. 
Such transnational affinities mean that being a British or French Muslim cannot be 
defined independent of one’s identification with the fate of Muslims in South Asia or 
the Middle East. National governments are faced with the challenge of how to 
counter such radicalization through strategies ranging from education to counter-
terrorism to surveillance. In the face of transnational religious loyalties, allegiance to 
the modern, territorial nation-state comes under threat.  
And whilst there are several mitigating factors behind those divisions, a perception on 
the part of many Muslims that one of the things that distinguishes them from the West 
is a way of life that is fundamentally religious, is clearly primary. It also highlights, in 
passing, the fact that Europe (to a lesser extent North America) may always have 
been a secularizing ‘exception’ to an otherwise mainly religious world. But the 
influence of globalization—both in the way in which immigration has engendered a 
new generation of cultural diversity, and in the way international tensions between the 
superpowers shape the political sympathies of a religious diaspora—‘brings that 
home’ very starkly. Such is the postcolonial, ‘glocal’ nature of religious identity and 
affiliation in a post-secular society. 
  
3.2 Religious and Spiritual Capital 
Secondly, much of the research into the new visibility of religion over the past 
generation focuses on how religious organizations are especially adept at mobilizing 
networks of activism and association, with beneficial effects for local civil society. Yet 
it is clear that such faith-based activism combines the material dimensions of social, 
economic and human capital with other resources of metaphysical beliefs, ethics and 
attitudes.  
In their review of the literature around the debate about social capital and religion, 
Chris Baker and Jonathan Miles-Watson draw a distinction between religious and 
spiritual capital. Religious capital denotes the ‘what’ of faith-based contributions, or 
‘the concrete and tangible actions and resources that faith groups contribute to civil 
society’, whereas spiritual capital refers to the “why”, or: ‘that area of belief or faith 
that actually energizes or motivates our ethical and public living’.10 The former 
denotes the material aspects of social capital; but the latter refers to the metaphysical 
dimensions of faith-based contribution.  
Baker and Miles-Watson argue that in reality the two cannot be separated, since 
spiritual capital ‘energises religious capital by providing a theological identity and 
worshipping tradition, but also a value system, moral vision and a basis of faith’.11 
Other commentators have spoken of ‘faithful capital’ as a kind of synthesis of the 
‘what’ of the religious and the ‘why’ of the spiritual, whereby sets of distinguishing 
practices such as ‘local rootedness’, ‘acceptance of failure’, ‘genuine participation 
and working together’ are undergirded by language and values such as ‘love’, ‘hope’, 
‘judgement’, ‘forgiveness’, ‘remembrance’ and ‘hospitality’.12 
So we must consider not just how religious agents re-emerge into public policy as 
                                                     
10
 Chris Baker and Jonathan Miles-Watson, Faith and Traditional Capitals: Defining the Public Scope of 
Spiritual and Religious Capital. Implicit Religion (e-book: 2010), pp. 17–69. 
11 Ibid., p. 33. 
12
 Archbishops' Commission for Urban Life and Faith, Faithful Cities: A call for celebration, vision and justice 
(London: Church House Publishing, 2006), p. 3. 
 
welcome sources of social capital and human resources, but also how their renewed 
visibility requires the discourse of public life to accommodate the ‘why’ of 
metaphysical alongside the ‘what’ of their material resources; and this is at the heart, 
perhaps, of the post-secular dilemma. We may like the prospect of an attenuated 
public square finding new sites of voluntary labour and activism; we may warm to the 
idea that religion can revitalize the tired conventions of public morality; but on the 
other hand, we worry whether or not the conventions of liberal democratic polity can 
survive the incursion of partisan, religious beliefs and values that often appear to 
belong to a bygone and oppressive age.  
 
3.3 Religious Identity Politics 
A third area has been the way in which religious identity has demanded to be 
reincorporated back into the vocabulary and repertoire of equality and diversity 
policies. Tariq Modood calls this the manifestation of ‘Ethno-Religious Assertiveness’. 
The new visibility of religion complexifies liberal democratic notions of equality and 
diversity, formerly conceived along lines of race and ethnicity but not religion 
(because that was assumed to be epiphenomenal). Modood terms this dominant 
mode of discrimination ‘colour-racism’, reflecting predominantly secularist legislation 
and policy that was ‘tone deaf’ to religion.13  
Since the 1950s, UK and European law has seen the gradual introduction of 
significant legislation to guard against discrimination in employment, provision of 
services, education and other human rights, making it illegal to discriminate against 
someone on grounds of gender, race, sexual orientation, disability and marital status. 
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In more recent years it has also been unlawful to discriminate against workers 
because of their religion or belief, or lack of religion or belief, either through direct or 
indirect discrimination, harassment or victimization. So in the UK the Employment 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations of 2003 and the Equality Acts of 2006 and 
2010 extended those principles of basic protection against discrimination to 
questions of ‘religion and belief’. What is called ‘reasonable accommodation’ must be 
made in respect of employees’ observance of religious dress, holidays, diet and 
provision of prayer space at work.  
But introduction of faith into existing legislation has also been problematic when 
traditional values of faith come into conflict with more progressive assumptions of 
secular liberalism. If we think of basic human rights in relation to the burkini ban – 
which ‘human right’ trumps the other? The post-Enlightenment prohibition on the 
public display of religious symbolism or affiliation meets the expression of an 
emergent European Muslim identity which does not conform to this particular 
configuration of public neutrality and private profession. Is it significant, also, that this 
particular religious version of the ‘culture wars’ is inscribed on the bodies of women? 
Another of the unintended consequences of this legislation has been the emergence 
of a particular class of legal cases, which concern Christians who evoke this 
legislation in support of claims that for whatever reason they have experienced 
discrimination on the grounds of being Christian at work. Often, this concerns 
instances where an individual has been disciplined or even dismissed for expressing 
views and opinions that have been held to contravene other clauses in the same 
Equalities and Diversity Acts. So Evangelical Christians with conservative views on 
same-sex marriage, or LGBTI rights, for example, who have expressed those views 
in the workplace have found themselves disciplined; and have taken their cases to 
law citing freedom of religion. It leaves us with a tension between equality premised 
on liberal models of a neutral, non-partisan, agnostic public realm, and sensitivity 
towards public displays of religious conviction. Policy-makers are caught between the 
seemingly incommensurable hierarchies of equality, and are left struggling on how to 
adjudicate between rival sensibilities around religion.  
Whatever the rights and wrongs of these individual cases, it seems to me they 
expose a deep dis-ease about the nature of religious faith in our society and to reveal 
to a large extent a deficit of what we might call ‘religious literacy’: basic information 
about religion—its values and obligations—as well as lack of first-hand experience of 
what it means to be a person of faith. It leaves us with huge unanswered questions 
about the basis on which religion is mediated into the public square; the extent to 
which religious belief and conviction is ‘normalized’ or not within a functionally secular 
society; and how the ambivalent legacy of religion as both source of social cohesion 
and conflict can be acknowledged and managed.  
 
4. Reflexivity and Rapprochement  
 
4.1 Religious Literacy 
Such a unique and unprecedented combination of resurgent religion and persistent 
and implacable secularism is one of the reasons for the emergence of debates about 
religious literacy. There is need for greater understanding of and knowledge about 
religion, in all aspects of public life.  
The term first came to prominence with the publication of Stephen Prothero’s book 
Religious Literacy in 2001. Prothero’s work is especially interesting given the theme 
of this journal issue, since his core thesis is that even though the separation of 
Church and State in the United States—and therefore the prohibition on teaching 
religion in public schools—is enshrined in American public policy, levels of basic 
knowledge of religion are so low that people are incapable of understanding the 
nuances of much that goes on around them.14  
Not only are people ill-equipped to understand the impact of religion on world affairs, 
says Prothero, but they are lamentably ignorant of the religious roots of their own 
cultural heritage as well as those of their neighbours. It breeds a kind of parochialism, 
an inability to appreciate pluralism, and it breeds a kind of ‘forgetting’ of the religious 
narratives, values and symbols that, however attenuated, still inform our political and 
cultural life today.  
So basic knowledge of religious traditions is important not just at a personal level but 
as a basic matter of cultural literacy. In order to be truly educated, argues Prothero, 
we need to aspire to a level of religious literacy. It is a pre-requisite of responsible 
and effective citizenship. We cannot make good political judgements without it; and 
once more, that is something that extends across the spheres of local, national and 
international politics. In the case of the US, for example, religious literacy might 
enable greater understanding of the beliefs of one’s next-door neighbour, or how faith 
informs presidential campaigns, or how religion shapes global conflicts.  
This is more than rote learning of facts. It extends to knowing the power of narrative 
to shape religious identity. ‘It is the ability to participate in our ongoing conversation 
about the private and public powers of religions.’15 As a result, Prothero concludes—
controversially—that whilst faith communities have a responsibility to cultivate wider 
public awareness, religious literacy should also feature on the curriculum of public 
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schools and higher education.16 He concedes that this may be regarded as a 
departure from the Constitutional separation of Church and State; but he responds by 
making a distinction between the teaching of religion and teaching about religion.17 
This approach affirms the following tenets as conditioning and framing religious 
literacy:  
(a) All religions are diverse;  
(b) religions evolve and change; 
(c) religious influences are embedded in all aspects of human experience and 
culture.18 
So religion is not something that can be reified or essentialized: all knowledge claims 
(including religious ones) are socially constructed and represent particular ‘situated’ 
perspectives. Is it even possible, I wonder, to say that such-and-such a religion is a 
religion of peace (or violence) or that it teaches ‘x’ truth or proposition? It is all about 
context and about the lived expression of faith in a particular place and time. So the 
question then becomes whether actually the best preparation for religious literacy is 
that of encounter with lived expressions of faith in all their complexity: an emphasis 
on the phenomenological rather than the doctrinal.  
 
4.2 Post-secular Rapprochement 
A second example of a greater reflexivity of faith, enacted in pursuit of specific 
common goals leads on from this spirit, of public engagement with religion as 
contextual, providing understanding of it as thoroughly embedded in culture and 
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being able to witness it in action. Studies are emerging now of forms of post-secular 
engagement in the public square that are inclusive and collaborative and yet do not 
conform to the original Rawlsian model of ‘bracketing out’ the particularities of 
transcendent truth-claims or religious language. Instead, the space of common 
endeavour becomes the place in which such world-views are mediated, not into a 
single language but into pragmatic common cause in which pluralist traditions 
cohabit.  
Such pragmatic collaborations across different faiths and philosophies represent 
what the urban geographers Justin Beaumont and Paul Cloke call ‘postsecular 
rapprochement’—partnerships forged from the ‘interconnections between religious, 
humanist and secularist positionalities in the dynamic geographies of the city’.19 They 
are embodied in community initiatives such as food banks, youth training centres, 
mental health projects and asylum campaigns that demand a collective political and 
ethical response. Such shared responses to social or economic need give rise to 
meaningful dialogue about the well-springs of participants’ motivations—what Baker 
and Miles-Watson term their ‘spiritual capital’20—to transform things for the better.  
Luke Bretherton relates the story of a meeting of London Citizens, a broad-based 
community organizing network, which for him exemplifies the new order in which 
‘different language [and religious] worlds stand side by side, sometime [sic] collide 
and sometimes overlap.’21 He writes about an event featuring a public lecture by a 
‘secular Jew’, Michael Sandel, held in an East London mosque, whose management 
has fought off claims of international links to al-Qaeda, which draws an audience of 
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trade unionists, party activists and religious leaders. Political and religious differences 
are not air-brushed away, but nor is such a gathering framed in terms of short-term 
political gains or single-issue campaigns, even though citizens’ organizing normally 
does have such a focus. Instead, many different value systems and ‘discursive 
frameworks’ are ‘collated’ into a shared conversation about ‘what it means to pursue 
justice (however conceived) where you live and alongside those who live beside 
you.’22 So rather than attachment to specific religious identity and practice of 
citizenship being mutually exclusive, they nurture one another in dialogue with 
religious and cultural ‘others’ whose difference is mitigated by being drawn into 
common cause in pursuit of local solidarity and where the repository of social capital 
embraces both the ‘why’ and the ‘how’. Faith-based activism does not have to 
surrender its distinctive moral or theological world-view in order to participate in the 
public realm. So there is always a tangible set of goals and a manageable political or 
civic space within which that is happening; but it is prepared to acknowledge that all 
faith-based action is also political or has political implications, so refuses to draw a 
strict distinction between ‘religious’ and ‘public’ life—or between the realms of 
discipleship and citizenship.  
For communities of faith, this highlights both ‘the difficulty and the importance of 
prioritizing participative listening and collaborative interpretation over any form of 
unitary dogmatism […] of activating the creative potential of normative fallibility, and 
of engaging the vital spaces between as well as within traditions and communities.’23 
These are the hallmarks of a ‘pragmatic public theology’ that is performative more 
than it is propositional and contextual more than it is dogmatic. Whilst it engages with 
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pluralism it recognizes its own rootedness in particular traditions and vantage-points, 
but seeks to mediate those into public debate.  
Despite theological and ideological differences which would appear to militate against 
any kind of moral or political affinity, the challenges of geographical proximity present 
opportunities for negotiated, provisional but nevertheless genuine collaboration. By 
basing civic engagement on what matters to stakeholders in a local community, the 
purpose of such post-secular rapprochement is not to impose a single metaphysical 
dogma but to nurture constructive alliances around shared moral tasks. It has proved 
remarkably successful in building respectful relationships based on reciprocal and 
public dialogue that bear fruit in the shape of sustainable local politics. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The post-secular is about combining a greater reflexivity towards the claims of 
secularization with a greater self-consciousness towards the choices informing one’s 
own religious convictions. It is about ‘learning to appreciate what [a] faith can mean 
for people of today’24—how it offers meaning, how it constructs a credible ‘action-
guiding world-view’, how it contributes to the common good. I argue therefore for the 
cultivation of public spaces of exchange and shared action which demonstrate how 
religion works for people in particular situations, in practice. It shows how immersion 
in a tradition might foster virtue and character which, contrary to the expectations of 
many, embodies a powerful and sustainable bond between the practice of faith and 
the exercise of citizenship.  
In such a model, shared territory and common interest in ‘the common good’—as a 
concrete practice, not an abstract concept—serve as catalysts for the creation of 
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spaces of hospitality in which everyone is invited to tell their stories, offer their 
testimonies, of their own particular vision of justice and flourishing—but most 
fundamentally, how that is nurtured by the well-springs of faith. And actually, that 
process begins with a perennial (and for some, a sacred) question: Who is my 
neighbour? 
